The enhanced Affordable Care Act premium tax credits expired on December 31, 2025, exactly as Congress had written them to years earlier. The House passed a three-year extension a week later, on January 8, 2026 — 230 votes, seventeen of them Republican. The Senate never took it up. A bipartisan working group spent January trying to find a deal and came up empty, undone less by the price tag than by an unrelated fight over abortion-funding language and health savings accounts. The bill for that standoff is now arriving in mailboxes.
The enhanced credits began in 2021 under the American Rescue Plan, then got a second life through 2025 in the Inflation Reduction Act. They removed the ACA’s original income cap on subsidy eligibility and capped what any enrollee paid at 8.5% of income, regardless of earnings. Congress wrote both extensions as temporary. Neither chamber wrote a third.
The fight over renewing them became one of the central issues in the government shutdown that closed much of the federal government for weeks last fall — a shutdown that ended in mid-November 2025 without an extension attached. The credits lapsed on schedule at year’s end.
Average monthly premium payments for people who kept coverage rose 58%, from $113 to $178, according to KFF’s analysis of 2026 marketplace data — and would have risen 114% for anyone who stayed in their exact 2025 plan rather than shifting to a cheaper tier. Average deductibles rose 37%, or $1,027, to a record $3,786.
Enrollment fell alongside the price. Effectuated marketplace enrollment dropped from 22.3 million to roughly 17.5 million — a loss of 4.8 million people. The falloff wasn’t even. Enrollees earning 400-500% of the federal poverty level, just above the income cap that came back when the enhancement expired, made up only 3% of 2025 sign-ups but 27% of the coverage losses; sign-ups in that bracket fell 44%. Adults 18-34 accounted for 46% of the total decline.
Health and Human Services Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. and CMS Administrator Mehmet Oz have attributed the enrollment drop to a fraud crackdown, not price. An HHS report found 5.6 million people it deemed fraudulently enrolled in 2025 and credited the removal of 2.9 million of them with most of this year’s decline. Brookings Institution health economist Matthew Fiedler called the claim “not remotely credible,” pointing to the premium data as the more direct explanation. Other analysts note the administration’s “phantom enrollee” figures conflate plan switches and partial-year sign-ups with fraud, and that the enhanced credits skewed enrollment younger and healthier — a group less likely to file claims regardless.
There’s a second dispute over who the credits actually helped. House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries has said more than 90% of recipients earn around $63,000 a year or less. Senators Katie Britt and Lindsey Graham have said the enhanced credits sent subsidies to “millionaires” and people earning over $400,000. Both claims have a basis: roughly 95% of recipients did earn at or below 400% of the poverty line, but the enhancement’s removal of the income cap made subsidies technically available, in rare cases, to large, older households in expensive markets earning far more.
A Commonwealth Fund analysis projects the expiration will cost roughly 339,000 jobs nationally in 2026 — 154,000 in healthcare, 185,000 elsewhere — as state economies absorb a $31 billion drop in federal marketplace funding. Ten states account for about three-quarters of that loss, led by Texas (83,400) and Florida (57,500). Seven of those ten states, including Texas, Florida, and Georgia, never expanded Medicaid, meaning the people losing marketplace coverage there have no fallback program to catch them.
The enhanced credits were built and re-upped as temporary relief, not a permanent expansion of the ACA: first as 2021 pandemic emergency spending, then as a bridge Democrats themselves wrote to expire at the end of 2025. The Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget estimated a full extension without offsetting cuts would add roughly $30 billion to the deficit in year one and $350 billion over a decade. Removing the ACA’s original income cap, even though few high earners actually used it, was a real departure from how the law was designed, and restoring some limit is a defensible correction, not a betrayal of the program.
President Trump called the proposed extension “a flagrant scam” and threatened a veto; Senate Majority Leader John Thune opposed reviving the credits outright. But the Republicans who stayed at the negotiating table weren’t proposing nothing — their offer was a two-year extension with income caps and a five-dollar monthly minimum premium, built to keep help flowing to people who need it while adding basic accountability.
Nine in ten recipients aren’t wealthy by any reasonable definition — they’re working- and middle-income people earning around $63,000 a year or less, exactly the group premium subsidies exist to help. The subsidy cliff data makes the stakes concrete: households earning just above 400% of the poverty line didn’t see a modest increase, they lost their subsidy entirely, and nearly half of them dropped coverage rather than pay full price. The job losses compound the point: concentrated in states that already declined to expand Medicaid, meaning many of the same people losing marketplace subsidies have no expanded program underneath them either. And the fraud framing used to justify letting the credits lapse hasn’t held up under independent review, which makes it harder to accept as the real reason for the drop in coverage rather than the preferred one.
Neither side’s argument requires denying the other’s numbers. The credits were designed to expire, and Congress had every legal right to let that happen. Letting it happen also carries a documented, specific cost, landing hardest on people just above the old income line. The version of a deal that came closest to passing — a multi-year extension, income-capped, with a modest minimum premium — addressed both concerns at once, and it still died. Not over the subsidy amount. Over an unrelated fight about abortion-funding language and health savings accounts. That’s the version worth watching if Congress returns to this before next year’s premiums are set. It’s still sitting on the table.
Cohn’s account of the ACA’s decade of political survival is the long version of the fight over these six weeks — the same argument about who health insurance is for, replayed with different numbers.
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